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Abstract 
Hospitals, and in particular the operating room, have not universally adopted a checklist 
system as a way to increase communications and decrease errors. Analyses showed that 
communication at Navy Hospital Twenty-nine Palms was less than optimal, leading to 
errors, such as delayed surgical start times and equipment errors, although patient safety 
was not affected. After thorough research, including a comprehensive literature review, 
and investigation by the author and operating room director, it was decided that the 
World Health Organization/The Joint Commission comprehensive surgical checklist and 
the Team STEPPS communication technique would be adapted and implemented to 
increase communication. Implementation of these programs would undergo evaluation 
through monitoring and staff interviews on a continual basis by committee members and 
process adjustments if needed after committee member agreement. This checklist would 
flatten the hierarchy and improve the operating room process, increasing patient safety. 
This checklist to increase communication in the operating room is not expected to 
prevent all errors but could increase safety by creating a shared mental model and 
increased distribution of responsibility to all health care personnel involved. By 
empowering every team member, from technicians to surgeons, the ability to raise 
concerns raises the standards for patient safety. 
3 
Key words: Checklist, Culture of safety, Error management, Operating Room procedure, 
Operating room teamwork, Swiss cheese model, Team STEPPS 
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Introduction 
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine reported that as many as 98,000 people die each year as 
a result of medical errors.) This equates to more people dying from medical errors than 
from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS.) The total national cost of 
preventable adverse events caused by this great loss is estimated to be between $17 and 
$29 billion dollars. The group stated that today's large, multifaceted health care system 
would require a comprehensive approach to improve patient safety. Human error is 
inevitable; its presence would greatly affect any multistep, complex system. Research by 
NASA into aviation accidents found that 70% of accidents involved human error? 
One area of possible improvement is communication. In a report released over 35 
years ago, it was suggested that 15% of human error was attributable to 
communication.3,4 However, as more recently reported by The Joint Commission, 
communication errors have been reported to cause over 60% of errors.) A large 
percentage of hospital errors occur in the operating room. Increased communication and 
subsequently increased teamwork can reduce patient risk and increase the chances of a 
successful operating room experience. 
Naval Hospital Twenty-nine Palms is not unlike other hospitals that have been 
studied. On mUltiple occasions, it was shown that a culture of patient safety was not 
present in the operating room. Several patients arrived on the day of surgery without 
orders from surgeons or medical histories documented in the computer charting system. 
On a few occasions, patients were taken into the operating room without markings on the 
surgical site, the proper equipment was not prepared for the surgical procedure, or the 
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technicians did not know the procedure being performed. After a thorough review of the 
system, it was decided that a complete redesign was needed, including implementation of 
new work flow and communication processes. 
Although there have been previous initiatives to address these issues by 
improving communication and reducing interruptions, these initiatives failed to be 
integrated as a culture in the operating room and were not sustainable. Multiple reasons 
may have contributed to this problem, including being implemented by an outside source 
or systems that were too complex. The intrinsic value of these initiatives was also 
difficult to identify by the nurses, technicians, and doctors, who were seemingly slowed 
by the process. These systems were also introduced as rigid processes, which did not 
allow for modification by those using the system. To be successful in implementing a 
culture of safety, it was imperative to avoid these pitfalls. 
The purpose of this project was to determine whether implementation of a patient 
safety-oriented system of checklist usage and increased communication would lead to a 
decrease in errors such as incorrect equipment or nonworking equipment, delays in 
surgical care, or delays in the preoperative process. 
Materials and Methods 
Literature review 
Because of advances in research and new technology, the medical system has become 
extremely complex and intricate; it has exceeded the ability of doctors, nurses, and other 
health care workers to deliver its benefits safely, effectively, and reliably.s Many medical 
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errors occur in the operating room. In 2010, the World Health Organization performed a 
study in 10 different countries, which included both high-income and low-income 
hospitals, and found that by increasing communication through the use of a checklist, 
errors in the operating room were reduced by 10.6%.5 
6 
The field of medicine begins with the education model. Medical training is a long 
and arduous process. Throughout this education, health care workers are taught that the 
current system is the best possible. Subsequently, when problems arise, the system is not 
blamed; rather the same highly educated doctors, nurses, and other health care personnel 
are implicated. Placing blame on a single person creates a person-centered analysis; in 
this approach, the focus is on the ever-present human factor. The errors are then classified 
as knowledge-based, rule-based, or skill-based.6 
An opposing model is the system-centered approach, which assumes that humans 
are fallible and systems must be designed to prevent mistakes. To focus on a solution, 
researchers began investigating outside the hospital to find other industries with similar 
maladies that they immulate. 7 Aviation was one comparable industry; with its ability to 
increase and maintain safety over the past 35 years, aviation can be considered an 
excellent role model. 
It is well documented that human deficiencies, particularly poor teamwork, 
contribute to > 50% of accidents in aviation. Therefore, teamwork and error management 
programs are mandatory in aviation. Crew Resource Management teaches aviators to 
communicate and coordinate as a team, reducing errors by making better use of human 
resources available.8,9 
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The largest crash in aviation history, the collision of two Boeing 747s in Tenerife, 
Spain in 1977, illustrates what can happen when these techniques are not used. This 
accident was different from others not only due to the number of fatalities, but also 
because of the cause. The pilot of a Dutch 747, under pressure to complete the flight 
within certain time limits, began to accelerate for takeoff. Based on audiotapes, it was 
clear that the copilot and flight engineer knew that permission had not been given by the 
tower to takeoff.7 The Dutch 747 and another Boeing 747 collided at a speed of250 
miles/h shortly thereafter, killing 583 people. 
Largely because of this accident, human interactions inside the cockpit were 
examined and changed. Flight engineers and copilots were taught that not only could they 
voice their concerns, but it was also their duty to do so. Hierarchy was flattened, and the 
power distance was decreased. The major changes in aviation were not in technology or 
equipment; the innovations were in the interpersonal relationship of the crew in which 
simple communication techniques and a checklist were used.5 
Hospitals, in particular the operating room, have not been as quick to adopt such a 
simple innovation as the checklist. Of all departments in the hospital, none are more 
similar to aviation than the operating room. Both the operating room and the airplane 
cockpit are highly technical and complex; even the names of surgical instruments and 
how to use them compare with a cockpit's flight information management system; that is, 
someone without extensive training would find each one useless.5,7,9 To complicate 
matters, operating rooms can also be high-pressure environments where good teamwork 
and communication are vital. Studies have estimated that one-half to two-thirds of all 
adverse events in the hospital are attributable to surgical care. 10 In one study almost 45% 
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of all patient errors occurred in the operating room of a hospital. I I In a Harvard medical 
practice study, 48% of adverse events were associated with a surgical procedure. 12 Of 
these errors, 43% could be directly attributed to communication. \3 In fact, 
communication failures are the cause of over 63% of sentinel events reported to The Joint 
Commission. 14 
Safety and communication have been shown to be correlative and increased by 
the use ofa checklist. In 2008, The Joint Commission and the World Health Organization 
began promoting a checklist for increased communication in the operating room. In 20 I 0, 
the New England Journal of Medicine published a landmark WHO study, which, among 
other things, showed that the use of a surgical checklist reduced the total number of 
complications from 27.3% to 16.7% in over 3,500 cases. 15 
The same study showed that a checklist in the operating room would reduce 
mortality by 0.7% and total complications by 10.6%.15 These studies resulted in the Joint 
Commission, World Health Organization, and Association of Perioperative Registered 
nurses checklist (Appendix B) being adopted in more than 4,900 hospitals in 122 
different counties, with 25 countries adopting the checklist on a national level. 16 The 
importance of a medical checklist was highlighted with the introduction of a bill into the 
House of Representatives. This bill requires the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, acting through the Center for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety, to 
conduct a study on the development and efficacy of medical checklists. This charge 
specifically includes the following requirements: the testing of different models of 
medical checklists, an examination of checklist development and use in other industries, 
and a measurement of the effects of the use of medical checklists on patient safety and 
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health outcomes. The bill further defines "medical checklist" as a predetermined, 
evidence-based, well-defined set of steps that should be completed during a designated 
medical clinical encounter or medical procedure. 17 
9 
Around the same time as the WHO study, another study showed that patients 
whose surgical teams exhibited less teamwork behaviors were at a higher risk for death or 
complications. 18 It must be noted that, the use of a checklist does not imply that a pilot, 
nurse, or physician require assistance in performing their job responsibilities. Checklists 
are meant to serve as a reminder for personnel to perform the mundane tasks that are so 
easily forgotten. 10 Checklists and crew resource management have become standards for 
how good pilots performs their duties. This same culture needs to be developed in 
medicine. 
Research on communication in medicine has shown the same communication 
principles that aviation learned 30 years ago.5,7,19 A large number of errors are shown to 
occur due to a simple lack of communication.5,7 In 2007, innovators used these data to 
transform institutions. One was Dr. Marty Makary, a pancreatic cancer surgeon who 
helped change Johns Hopkins Hospital. The results of his study showed that surgeons 
believe good communication occurs in the operating room 85% of the time, whereas 
nurses cited good communication only 45% of the time. I I This evidence illustrates a 
disparity between team members' communication observances in the operating room. 
Increased communication, checklist usage, and flattening of the hierarchy led to a 
dramatic improvement in patient safety in the operating room and the hospital as a whole. 
Communication failures in the operating room occur in approximately 30% of 
team exchanges, causing wasted resources, delays, interruptions in routine, procedural 
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errors, and increased tension.21 Use of the aviation industry's crew resource management, 
based on effective communication and teamwork skills, could be modified and translated 
to the hospital and operating room environment,9 with the goal of preventing medical 
errors and reducing negative outcomes.22 In Team Strategies and Tools to Enhance 
Performance and Patient Safety (Team STEPPS) communication techniques, many 
techniques have been used to facilitate teamwork and communication, including 
situational awareness and mutual support. Team STEPPS has been shown to increase 
health care morale and perceived patient safety.23 
In an extremely famous study named "Gorillas in Our Midst," Neisser and 
colleagues studied what they termed inattentive blindness. They asked people to watch a 
video and perform a task, such as count how many times a basketball bounces. They then 
had a man in a gorilla costume walk into the middle of the screen and make obvious 
gestures. Of 192 observers, 46% of people failed to notice the gorilla. When participants 
were told before the video that the gorilla would be present, 26% still failed to notice.24 
Inattentive blindness and lack of situational awareness, defined as the primary basis for 
subsequent decision making and performance in the operation of complex, dynamic 
systems, are the same phenomenon?5 At its lowest level, the operator needs to perceive 
relevant information (in the environment, system, self, and so forth), followed by the 
integration of the data in conjunction with task goals. At its highest level, operators must 
predict future events and system states based on this understanding.25 The use of 
communication techniques such as Team STEPPS have resulted in increased teamwork, 
communication, and a shared mental model and thus increased situational awareness and 
decreased inattentive blindness.26 By increasing communication, decreasing hierarchy, 
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and increasing situational awareness, patient safety is increased. Medical team training 
has also increased operating room team function, as shown in a study of 4,862 cases, 
decreasing surgical delays. Impressively, these changes were found to be sustained at 24 
months.27 
The low mortality rate shown with hospital procedures (as low as 1.5%) has made 
it difficult to statistically measure intervention results in any but the largest institutions; 
even then, it would be a complex study involving long amounts of time. To elicit the 
effectiveness of interventions, the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, created by the 
University of Texas and the Center for Healthcare Quality and Safety, was investigated.28 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire is a refinement of a questionnaire derived from a 
commercial aviation survey, The Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire.29 The 
Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was deemed to be a psychometrically sound device for 
eliciting the safety climate of any hospital area.30 In addition, it can be used to measure 
teamwork, identify disconnects between or within disciplines, and evaluate interventions 
aimed at improving patient safety.30-39 Because many of the patients at Naval Hospital 
Twenty-nine Palms are ambulatory (same day discharge), it was also confirmed that the 
survey was applicable to the ambulatory setting.40,41 
Methods 
A system for patient safety has not been utilized continually at Navy Hospital Twenty-
nine Palms. This created a tendency to rely on individual practitioners, not the system, to 
intercept errors. A checklist, which was not individualized for the operating room, was 
felt to be burdensome and ineffective by the staff. The preoperative "timeout" was 
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performed per The Joint Commission standards; however, the staff reported that they 
only performed this to meet requirements. There was no morning huddle performed, as 
recommended by Team STEPPS, and situational awareness suffered, as evidenced by the 
lack of appropriate equipment for certain surgeries or scheduling changes. The operating 
rooms consist of several functional areas, including the preoperative clinic, where the 
patient is seen 1 week before surgery; the preoperative area, where a patient is prepared 
on the day of surgery; the intraoperative area or operating room; and the post anesthesia 
recovery unit. Each of these environments has areas that could benefit from system 
improvement. Because of their complex interrelatedness, it is impossible to address any 
one area without addressing all of them. 
The Association of Peri operative Registered NursesfW orld Health 
Organization/The Joint Commission combined surgical checklist (Appendix A) was 
utilized as the cornerstone of the changes. This checklist was validated in the Safe 
Surgery Saves Lives campaign, which included almost 4,000 surgical patients and had 
shown a decline of mortality after surgery from 1.5% to 0.8%.41 In his book The 
Checklist Manifesto, Atul Gawande recommended adjustment of this checklist to meet 
local hospital requirements. Gawande further explained, "Even organizations that 
perform identical tasks have different personalities. Interpersonal relationships are 
different, local requirements are not the same and different objectives are required to 
satiate local needs."s 
Therefore, the involved personnel, which included a general surgeon, obstetrician, 
2 operating room technologist, and a nurse anesthetist, adjusted the Association of 
Perioperative Registered Nurses/The Joint Commission checklist to meet suggested 
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safety requirements and to fit the military medical model (Appendix B).42 The checklist 
was adjusted to include corpsman and other specific military considerations. Because of 
the multiple differences between military and civilian medicine, it is prudent to discuss 
the military medical model. Care providers such as surgeons, obstetricians, nurses, and 
anesthesia providers receive the same primary training as civilians, with some physicians 
having civilian residencies and some having military-based residencies. All have 
completed military officer training. Some have received specialized training, which could 
include trauma training or training with different techniques or equipment. 
The providers are of varying levels of seniority, beginning with 0-1 and with 
decreasing amounts of clinical duties once 0-5 or 0-6 is reached. Hospital corpsmen are 
enlisted personnel without a college degree but with specialized training. Corpsmen begin 
their training with basic medical care and basic field medical care. Depending on multiple 
factors, some obtain further training in areas such as operating room techniques, 
radiology techniques, and different levels of medical assistance. These individuals also 
have multiple ranks of seniority (E2-E5 or E6), with higher ranks performing less clinical 
and more administrative work. 
The created checklist was then bought to the Surgical Teamwork Readiness 
Initiative to Prevent Errors and Ensure Safety (STRIPES) team for adjustments. After a 
I-month trial, it was adjusted to reflect staff concerns and reworked to include items that 
were previously neglected. The final checklist (Appendix C) is version 13. This new 
checklist is utilized in a left to right fashion, beginning with the initial preoperative visit 
with the surgeon. The most efficient way to fix some of the internal processes was to 
place items on the checklist. Some of these errors were patient arrival on the morning of 
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surgery without surgeon orders being placed, postoperative visits not being scheduled, 
and not having the proper antibiotics prepared for the day of surgery. 
Results 
Creation of the checklist at Twenty-nine Palms 
14 
The implementation of an improved physician ordering system was created to 
increase standardization and to streamline the system to reduce errors. By making the 
checklist a working document, following the patient throughout the perioperative process, 
many dilemmas have been relieved (Figure 1). 
The new process begins when the surgeon visits with the patient preoperatively, 
placing orders on the checklist, and attaches the checklist to the chart. The nurse then 
places these orders into the computerized ordering system during their preoperative visit. 
Once the patient arrives on the day of surgery, the corpsman, nurses, and other providers 
continue to use the checklist during every phase of surgery. 
To address communication techniques and flatten the hierarchy, the Team 
STEPPS communication techniques are utilized during a 7:00 morning meeting that is 
held between all staff, including surgeons, nurses, surgical technologists, and anesthesia 
providers, in a centralized location in the operating room. During the perioperative 
process, The Joint Commission standards and the Team STEPPS model are used during a 
more robust timeout process, again utilizing the checklist. 
At the end of a surgical procedure, a procedural debrief is implemented. A debrief 
is defined as a process that allows discussion of individual and team performance, 
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identification of errors made, and development of plans to improve the next 
performance.43 An effective debrief is defined as containing the following: the 
appropriate approach, an established learning environment, learner engagement, a 
managed learner reaction, reflection, analyses, diagnoses, and application to real clinical 
practice.44 The debriefing timing was difficult to plan in the operative setting. It is 
desirable to minimize the amount of time a patient is under anesthesia and for operating 
room teams to be efficient to reduce cost. It is also important to perform the debriefing 
immediately as information is still close at hand.45 It was decided, to meet all criteria, that 
staff would perform the debrief before the surgical drapes were removed and while the 
patient was still under anesthesia. This timing allowed for the uninterrupted attention of 
everyone in the room during a period of calm and during a period of low surgical 
workload. To maintain efficiency and to keep this surgical pause short and purposeful, 
staff utilized the same surgical checklist; the debrief was also documented on the 
checklist. 
Twenty-four hours after surgery, the checklist was used for the last time to make 
postsurgical and anesthesia follow-up visits or phone calls. This utilization ensured 
review of the surgical data and completion of a postoperative follow-up with the patient. 
It also presented all surgical data in an easy to read format standardized for all patients. 
Before implementation of this new system, permission was received from the 
Center for Healthcare Quality (Appendix H) to utilize an altered version of the Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire. 
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Feedback and redesign of the checklist and Team STEPPS communication plan 
The article "Effective surgical safety checklist implementation," described three ways to 
implement checklists: the team effort method, the empowering leader, and the laissez 
faire leader. 16 Of these three, the team effort model was found to be the most successful, 
whereas the laissez faire leader was the least. On the basis of interviews conducted where 
checklists have been implemented, staff have distinguished highly effective 
implementation as including active leadership, deliberate enrollment, extensive 
discussion and training, piloting, multidisciplinary communication, real-time coaching, 
and ongoing feedback. 16 
In the team effort model, the multidisciplinary team consists of personnel from 
each field. These principles were used to form the previously mentioned STRIPES team. 
The team consisted of one surgeon, one obstetrician, one anesthesia provider, and one 
operating room technician (Appendix C). This organization spearheaded the 
communication plan and checklist changes. Team STEPPS communication techniques 
were selected because of its applicability, current usage in the military health system, and 
history of creating the environment proven to increase patient safety. 
The communication and checklist plan at the operating room of Twenty-nine 
Palms included the following tasks. The operating room day began with a morning 
huddle of all team members. Using the checklist as a guide, the morning huddle allowed 
for a safety pause to realize problems during a time when they can be addressed with 
minimal changes to schedule or workload. This morning huddle focused less on patients 
and more on providing every member of the operating team increased situational 
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awareness of the days' plan. The timing of the surgeries, status of equipment, possible 
changes to the schedule, and personnel were discussed. 
17 
During preparation of the new system patient safety and risk management system, 
it was investigated whether it was possible to change the operating room procedure and 
checklist without changing the hospital-wide Invasive Procedure Instruction. Although 
the Invasive Procedure Instruction contained a checklist and posters (Appendix D), they 
did not meet current Joint Commission standards and were not user friendly, although 
deviation from hospital instruction is unacceptable. The Invasive Procedure Instruction 
has been revised and is now a part ofthe hospital instruction. A new simplified, user-
friendlier poster and checklist were also created (Appendix E). New checklist posters 
have been placed in treatment rooms throughout the hospital and the operating room. 
This has provided the additional benefit of not only changing the operating room 
procedures but also changing the entire hospital. 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was adjusted to reflect the complexities of the 
military environment and differences in military staffing and personnel. As previously 
discussed, the US Navy utilizes corpsman to perform many functions in the military 
hospital. This is unique to the military environment and subsequently alterations were 
needed. 
Implementation of the checklist and communication process 
To implement the changes, a multistep process was utilized by the STRIPES group 
(Appendix D). After the team tasked with implementation was assembled, it was soon 
officially recognized by the hospital (Appendix D). Multiple meetings with the author 
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and surgical director were completed during the preparation phase to ensure full support. 
The implementation committee met multiple times to discuss solutions to the various 
aspects of the program. The members then began talking with their respective colleges to 
generate interest and excitement about the new system. A meeting with all operating 
room staffwas later convened for dissemination of data on the effectiveness of the 
communication. 
To introduce each of the process improvements, data were presented to all of the 
operating room staff to justify why changes were imperative and how safety and flow in 
the operating room could be improved. The staff also watched videos created by the 
committee illustrating the Team STEPPS communication techniques and received copies 
of the checklist for review. These videos illustrated how the morning huddle, timeout, 
and debrief should be performed. This gave staff members a visual idea of how the safety 
pauses should be completed while allowing for individualism in style. To allow the staff 
to participate in the changes, they were asked for their input on adjustment of the 
checklist and process. Input was given verbally to any member of the committee or via 
survey if the member wanted to remain anonymous. 
The main objective of the initiative was a more patient-centered focus of care, but 
the expected outcome was a change in the safety culture in the operating room at Navy 
Hospital Twenty-nine Palms. Evaluation by the author was performed on a continual 
basis, with input from the monitoring committee and entire operating room staff. 
Discussion 
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The survey and communication project was implemented first for a I-month trial. 
Adjustments and changes were then made for implementation in the operating room. 
There was much resistance to changes from operating room personnel, most notably from 
surgeons and nurses. Staff members with less exposure to the Team STEPPS technique 
were the most resistant to changes. However, also of note was whether increased time 
since training, whether surgical residency or nursing school, caused increased resistance. 
Many meetings and discussions were required, both formal and informal to obtain buy-in 
from the staff. The director of surgical services also assisted by discussing the project in 
person and utilizing e-mails with staff. 
After 4 months, the morning huddle, the timeouts, and checklist use began to 
become more integrated as part of the normal working environment at the hospital. 
Although further changes may be needed as errors are recognized, the now increased 
communication will assist with reducing consequences from errors. 
The survey results showed increased caregiver attitude toward patient safety in the 
hospital. In the survey, each staff member ranked the level of communication of all other 
staff members. The average of these scores was then tallied and compared. Before 
implementation, 18 surveys were returned; after implementation, 19 surveys were 
returned. Because of rapid staff changes inherent in a military hospital, all general 
surgeons and one of two orthopedic surgeons changed during implementation of the 
initiatives. This created a weakness in the study, although it is a weakness that cannot be 
controlled. The survey showed, however, that overall the communication score increased 
from an average of3.59 to 3.73 (Figure 2). 
Patient Safety and Communication in the Operating Room 20 
Attitudes of staff regrading communication before and after implementation are 
shown in Figures 3 and 4. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, perceived communication of 
surgeons decreased from an average of 3.89 to 3.29. It is possible that implementation of 
the checklist decreased communication between surgeons and other specialties, although 
that is the opposite of the desired outcome and not thought to be the impetus in this 
situation. During implementation of the checklist procedure, all staff surgeons left except 
for two. This created two new general surgeons, two new obstetricians, and one new 
orthopedic surgeon, with 5 of 7 replaced during the study. It is possible that new staff 
surgeons did not communicate as effectively as previous surgeons. There was also a short 
period between new surgeon arrival and postchange survey distribution. A longer 
introductory period could have resulted in increased communication scores. 
The original goal was to make patient-centered safety, communication, and 
checklist use part of the operating room culture at Navy Hospital Twenty-nine Palms. 
Team STEPPS communication, the morning huddle, the preoperative timeout, and 
checklist use have been implemented and are still being used for 1 year since first 
implemented. It is unclear whether these interventions have now become part of the 
hospital culture. However, checklist data, medical team management. and Team STEPPS 
have allowed greater patient safety at Naval Hospital Twenty-nine Palms compared with 
before intervention. As more studies are completed, improved interventions will be found 
and, based on the creation of the patient safety culture, will be implemented without 
hesitation. 
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Figure 1. Patient Flow from Time of Initial Appointment Through Post-Op 
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Figure 4. Post Implementation Staff Communication Scoring 
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COMPREHENSIVE SURGICAL CHECKLIST 
Blue = World Health Organization (WHO) Green - The Joint Commission - Universal Protocol (JC) 2013 National Patient Safety Goals Oranqe - JC and WHO -
PREPROCEDURE SIGN -IN TIME-OUT SIGN-OUT 
CHECK-IN 
In Holding Area Before Induction of Anesthesia Before Skin Incision Before the Patient Leaves the Operating 
Room 
Patient/patient representative RN and anesthesia care provider Initiated by designated team member RN confirms: 
actively confirms with Registered confirm: All other activities to be suspended (unless a life-
Nurse (RN): threatening emergency) 
Identity D Yes Confirmation of: identity, procedure, Introduction ofteam members D Yes Name of operative procedure 
Procedure and procedure site D Yes procedure site and consent(s) Yes All: Completion of sponge, sharp, and 
Consent(s) D Yes Site marked D Yes D N/ A Confirmation of the following: identity, instrument counts D Yes D N/A 
Site marked D Yes D N/A by person performing the procedure procedure, incision Site, consent(s) Specimens identified and labeled 
by person performing the procedure D Yes D Yes D N/A 
Patient allergies D Yes D N/A Site is marked and visible D Yes D N/A Any equipment problems to be addressed? 
RN confirms presence of: D Yes D N/A 
History and physical D Yes Difficult airway or aspiration risk? Relevant images properly labeled and displayed 
D No D Yes D N/A 
Preanesthesia assessment 
D Yes (preparation confirmed) To all team members: 
D Yes Any equipment concerns? 
What are the key concerns for recovery and 
Risk of blood loss (> 500 ml) management of this patient? 
Diagnostic and radiologic test results D Yes D N/A Anticipated Critical Events 
# of units available D Yes D N/A --- Surgeon: 
Anesthesia safety check completed 
States the following: 
Blood products D critical or nonroutine steps 
D Yes D N/A D Yes D case duration 
Briefing: 
D anticipated blood loss 
Any special equipment, devices, All members ofthe team have Anesthesia Provider: 
implants discussed care plan and addressed D Antibiotic prophylaxis within one hour 
D Yes D N/A concerns before incision D N/A 
June 2013 D Yes 
Include in Preprocedure check- D Yes D Additional concerns? 
in as per institutional custom: 
Beta blocker medication given Scrub and circulating nurse: 
(SCIP) D Yes D N/A D Sterilization indicators have been 
Venous thromboembolism confirmed 
prophylaxis ordered (SClP) D Additional concerns? 
DYes D N/A a AORN Normothermia measures (SCIP) D Yes D N/A 
The JG does not stipulate which team member Initiates any section of the checklist except tor site marking. 
The Joint CommiSSion also does not stipulate where these activities occur. See the Universal Protocol for details on the JOint Commission requirements. 
Appendix B. The combined World Health Organization, Joint Commission 


























Teleohone ( ) 
ALLERGIES 
Diagnosis 
Consent signed and witnessed V N 
Date otH&P 
BP --1 __ p __ R __ r __ 
HI WI 
Procedure and site: 
Item. to btl ordered In b.e.1Ib for Pre·Op 
Order Set: 
Hand MSW/APU General OMS 
ABX: Ancel lG 0 Ancef 2G 0 
CefoxltlnlG 0 Cefoxltln 2G 0 
Doxycycline l00mg PO 0 
Gentamycln 80mg 0 Unasyn 3g 0 
Vancomycin lG 0 Other: 
LABS: HCG 0 Chem7CBC w/Diff 0 
LFT 0 Blood GlucoseType 8. Screen 0 
EKG >50 or Hx of cardiac 
SCD Bllat Left Right 
Con Lv ___ Llght DUty 
Follow-up Appt .-
'----
H ·tal TP S lCh 
" -'L ... .., Holding Time-out 
Immediately prior to incision 
pgtlent check In: ~I Team MemberS: --------
__ Confirmation of: Identity, procedure, Confirmation of: Identity, procedure, 
procedure site and consent(s) procedure site, consent, armband and 
__ Orders entered position. 
__ Site marked by Surgeon o Patient allergies 
__ IV LR lOooL KVO 
SeD's o Relevant Images properly labeled and -- displayed. __ Patlent allergies documented 
OSite marked and visible __ Anesthesia Interviewed the patient 
__ Name band, blood band and Allergy 
T~am members states the following: 
band In place 
~ __ History and physical updated within Position 
the past 24hrs OPrep 
OFoley 
o DVT prophylaxis on and working 
RN conflrms: o Medications on the Field? 
__ History and physical 
iYr.wnl 
__ Diagnostic and radiologic test results Oease duration? 
o Special conSiderations? __ Blood products 
__ Any special equipment. devices, 
&~f:ment/lmplant status Implants 
OSterlllzatlon Indicators have been 
conflrmed 
o Additional Concerns? 
Corpsman: 
&esthesla 
Antibiotic 1 hour prior to InCision 
SCIP Measures OType of Anesthesia? o Additional Concerns? Antibiotics within 1 hr prior to incision 
rJ Yes 0 N/A 
Beta blocker medication given a Ves a N/A o Special Introductions 
Venous Thromboembolism prophylaxis 
u Yes u N/A 




~II Team Members; 
Name of operative procedure 
o Completion of sponge, sharp, and 
instrument counts 
o Specimens Identified and labeled 
o Any equipment problems to be 
addressed? 
Estimated Blood Loss: 
IV Fluids: 
Urine output: 





o Antibiotic re-dosing needed? ___ 
What are the key concerns for recovery 
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Rober! E. Bush Nava! Hospital 
Medal of Honor ReciDien! 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
NAVAL HOSPJ:TAL 
BOX 788250 
JU.RDfE CORPS AXR (JROOH1) COMBAT CBN'rBR 
'I'Wmft'YlnltE PALX8 . CALX"OlUfU 922'1 8 -8250 :IN R.II:PLY REI'ER TO, 
5420 
OOFOO 
11 Apr 14 
From: 
To: 
Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital Twenty Nine Palms 
LT Derek Owens, NC, USN 
Subj: APPOINTMENT AS TEAM LEADER, STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
TEAM: CHECKLISTS 
Ref; (al NAVHOSP29PALMSINST 5450.lJ 
1. Effective immediately, you are appointed as Team Leader, 
Strategic Communications Team: Checklists. This appointment 
will remain in effect untiI your detachment, unless you are 
relieved in writing before that time. 
2. You will be guided in the conduct of your duties by 
reference (al. 
3. You will be assisted by a team to include the following 
members: 
a. CDR Ann Williams, NC, USN 
b. LCDR Amanda Feigel, MC, USN 
c. LT April McGill, MC, USN 
d. HM3 Kylie Guest, USN 
4. The Strategic Initiative Teams are chartered by the 
Executive Steering Committee (ESC). The ESC uplinks for the 
Strategic Communications Team are Executive Committee of the 
Medical Staff (ECOMSI and Public Affairs Officer (PAOI. 
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,.,PATIENT AND PREoPROCEDIJRAlo TEAM HAS BeEN CONFIRMED 
.lThe patlenfs Identity (Two IdenUfters) 
.... p~ure to be parformiid 
.... SldeJslte of the procedure 




)0 Patient and Provider signatures (prlnledlstamps name, 
date , and Ume 
-:-TIlE PROCEDURAUST HAS PllYStCAI.L Y SEEN TIlE PAlUT AND: 
"Revlawed relevant documentation to Include bill nollimited to: 
H&P, consent, nursing assessment and the anesthesia 
essessment 
"The procedural site hes been marked I'Iith the Proceduralist 
InltJals: 
)0 Yes and the Initials will be able to be seen after draping 
)oNe. the procedure is In a location where r1ghtllefl or 
upparr10wer Is not a factor 
)oNe, patient refused maridngs and this has been documented 
In the paUenfs chart 
.... COnfirmiid: 
.... H r1sk of a blood loss Is greater than 5OOml, a plan Is In place 
"Special treatmenlB, radiography, Implants, support personnel 
or other unique needs have been confirmed 
"ff applicable, prophylactic: antibiotics confirmed as given and 
at what time - an Is documented In the patient chart 
(0 THE ANESTHESIOLOGISTICRNA (wHEN APP\JCABI.E) HAS SEEN 
THE PATIEHT AND: 
.... Revlewed relevant documentallon 
.... COnfirmed: 
). Site Markings pertaining to anesthesiology 
» H a dlftlcutt airway - a plan has been documented lind the 
equipment made available. 
-l'W HAIR ReMOVAL WAS REQUIRED IT WAS DONE ACCORDING TO 
PROCEDURAL TEAM CONFIRMS: 
""Everyone has stated their name and role 
""The patient's name and date of birth 
,(The procedure 
"Side/Site/Position 
.... Antibiotics given -If applicable 




>Where the InCision/procedure will be Initiated 
)oAnySpeclftc Concerns 
)OOuratlon expectation 
» Critical Steps 
.; CoNFIRMED 
>That the site has been markecland Is visible after 
preparation and draping 
>Are relevant Images displayed 
>Jfrlgation fluids ara available If needed 
)oAs needed special safety precautions an! 
':'PROCEDURAUST HAs CONFIRMED 
" How the name of the procedure should 
be recorded 
.!The Instrument, sponges, and needle 
counts have been completed 
,fRevlawed any special circumstances 
and/or complications with the 
procedure.- and they have been 
documented in the patient's 
surgical/procedure notes 
{-Au SPECIMENS HAVE BEEN LABELED 
I ACCORDING TO POLICY 
-)1, THERE WERE ANY EQUIPMENT PROBlEMS 
WERE DOCUMENTED AND REPORTED TO 
APPROPRIATe AREAS 
~IJ: THE PATIENT IS AWAKE: 
"The patient was asked of they had any 
questions or concerns about the 
procedure or their recovery. 
which are based on patient hiStory or medication , .. _____________ .... 
use 
}>AII diagnostic tests, x-rays and any special 
equipment are and available for Immediate use 
ANESTHESIA IS BEING USED, THE 
"Confirms all maChinery and medication checks 
have been completed 
,1The pulse oximeter Is on the patient and 
functioning properly 
,(lndicates any speCific concerns 
VENOUS THROMBOSIS PROPHYLAXIS IS NEEDED 
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~niV8fSftl Proto801 'IOf Pr8081illr88 
1. Pre-procedure Verification 
Consent form signed, verified 
; 
Verify correct patient, procedure, and 
procedure site 
Verify resources needed (use checkl ist, when 
applicable) 
2. Mark t he Procedure 9t e 
Completed by provider doing the procedure 
Visible mark after prep and draping 
Done with provider's initials 
3. Time-out / Rnal safety check 
Re-verify pat ient, procedure, and 
procedure site 
Active participation by all involved in 
the procedure 
Repeat prior to any additional procedures 
performed 
4. Post-procedure Debrief 
Confirm who isordering any laboratory 
analysis for specimen(s) 
Verify specimen(s) 
Discuss any special orders, plan for post-
procedure care 
Appendix F. New Invasive Procedures Poster 
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Conduct a pre-procedure verification process 
Address missing information or discrepancies before starting the procedure. 
- Verily 11M> -....".ue. b' 11M> _patient allIM> _ *-
, 'MIen posstie, _IIM>,,;,IIM> voriIi:aIion process. 
, IderdifyllM>ilemslhal_be_b'lIM>pnJC:I!ClJte. 
, Use. __ lsi 10 wriyllM>..-yofilems b'IIM>JlRIQlCUe. 1ft is ro Ilea!SSillyID 
doaJneIt1hal1lM> lsi was usedb' eom paIienl)AI. nrintIn. 1hese iIems-= --~ Iisby and ~ o9lOd 1DISOI1Ib'm. JX1!'IIIOSIhesiassessmenl 
_ da!J105tic and radiology lest resUIs 1haI ... properly cispIayed 
~ radiology ~ and scans, paIhoIogy IIljIQI1s. biopsy repoI1s 
;my requi1!d bIood..-. ~ deW:es. special ~ 
, _lIM>ilemslhal ... lDbe_illIM>proc:abe .... lDlIM>patient 
Mark the procedure site 
At a minimum, mark the site when there is more than one possible location for the 
procedure and when performing the procedure In a different location could harm 
the patient 
, The sill! does !!!II need 10 be _ b' _ sIrudIIes. 
~ Ionsis,IMlries 
, For ...... pnx:ochIes: ...... 11M> general SI)inaI region 00 11M> sI<in. SpeQaI inIraa!>eratiVe inagi1g 
"""""""" maybe used III _ and mark 11M> erac:t __ 
, ...... 11M> silo before 11M> pnx:1IINIe is performed. 
, U posstie, _11M> patient;,1he sill! rnarmg process. 
, The siIe is _ by a _ iIdependenI pmcIiIionerwho is UIinaIeIy""'-b' 11M> 
JlRIQlCUe and wi be presenllIIIen .... JlRIQlCUe is performed. , 
, lImIII!Ir.1IM> _ iIdependenI pradiIiJner is.....-b' .... proc:abe - ..... lIIIen 
cIeIo!g;Iq silo na1IiIg. 
' In _ ciaInsIances. silo rnarmg may be deIegaIed 10 sane meticaI-. 
~_(PA~ or_poadiceregismd ...... (AP.RNl 
, The mark is 0I1aII1IJipIIJs and is used mnsisfenIIJ IIwtujlolC IIM> ___ 
, The mark is made at or.-1he proc:abe siIe. 
, The markis......, .......... lDbe __ smpreparalilland$api1g. 
, __ ... ro .... sdemeansofrnarmg .... siIe. 
, For paIienIs who ...... silo rnarmgallllen l is BDiI:aIya anaIDn'icaIyn.,.-or~ 
IDmark .... silo(see ......... _~Use ____ s-.. _proa!SSlD ....... 
1haI .... _siloisoperaledcn EJarc>lesof_IhaI ___ _ 
_ ...-or perilBIIn 
_ aa:ess pIIlCI!Ibos I!eoIi'g a __ -. __ pe!QIIaneOuS 
or IIwooql a natural orifice 
__ prIlQ!dI.n cases b'wIich 1he calhelerorinslnlnent insertioo silo is 
ro poedelem1i1od 
~ cardac--. pacemakerinsertioo -- premaUe i1fanIs, b' wIIom .... mark may cause. pe!I11IIIOflIlaIIDo 
Perform a time-out 
The procedure is not started until all questions or concerns are resolved. 
, ConIuc1a _ inInadiaIeIy beb'e sating 1he _ proc:abe or ~ 1he_ 
, A.~_oI1heteamsBts 1110_ 
, The_is_ 
, The _ irMMs 1he _ -'oflho proc:abe loam: 1110 i1dMduaI ~ 1110 
~_provideIs,ciaAating ....... ~IIIOIII-.and __ 
paI1icipanIs who wi be parIi:ipaIiIg ;, 0Ie JlRIQlCUe flom 1110 beginniIg. 
, AI_ -'oIOIeproc:abe team dIoIy _<bing 1110_ 
, Ilomg 0Ie_1ho team -. _. ata mNrun,1fI1ho-.g: 
_ patient iIenIiy 
_sill! 
protI!Ibe 10 be done 
, 'MIen 1he ...... patient has 1M> or I1118IJ1lC1!1beS: 11he _ ~""1IOIJICUe 
~ ano1herlinlHU _10 be ~ _ sating eom pI1lCIl<ba 
, DorunenIOIe ...... of Ole _ Theorganizalion _lhearodand Iype m_ 
This document has been adapted from the full Universal Protocol. For specific requirements 
of the Universal Protocol, see The Joint Commission standards. 
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·.·he Univsl'5ity of Texas 
1'I,,1Itf1 s"'"...,., (;.,~ .3ot 11ou..-, 
!Jellr lJerek O~Yens, 
UniVWIAIt: 4f T-"!IM,,! F.nton.Mn ...... ilI ,Hell1Kllft 
Cerda' ~e ~ ~t"nltKllr~ r:a. ... 1t1I .... - "-'''*y 
You ha~ our jlGnnission1o usc any of Ihc fcUowing Safety Attih.ldes QlIe!;YUl'lr!aires and 
ihe corresponding 5coring k.e}'6: . . 
Safety,\ttitudes QuestiOnnaire - Short Form 
Saf4Xy Attitudes QoosH>nnaire ,. Tearm'o'Ork.:L'Id Safety Clirmate 
Safety Attitudes Que~ion"aire - Amtx.dalo~ Version 
SafetY.l'.ttitudeH QueSiionnaire -Ieli Version 
Safety I\ttitudes Questionnaire - Laber aM l)eJr~1Y Versior. 
Safety AttitudGs allO~ionnairc - ~erating Room Ver!>ion 
Saf,*y AninJdP.e Questionnai~ - Phannaey Vasion 
Safety Climate Survey 
Please nore, '.ve lID nol have edi!abl~ '/~siDIIS for any of the SAQ surveys oot ieej free ~o 
modify the SlIlVe'f1! to meet YOI.lr researclJ endeavors. 
Respec:ft.llly, 
Uni'/ersity rJiTeJlal; at IloU$t(li'-Mnmotiall-Ic."R\ann 
Center for Heafthcare Oll3Rty 3hd SafetY' Team 
I ".llk "'.w: I"'. 
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